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Abstract
We study decision problems where (a) preference parameters are dened to
include psychological/moral considerations and (b) there is a feedback e¤ect
from chosen actions to preference parameters. In a standard decision problem
the chosen action is required to be optimal when the feedback e¤ect from ac-
tions to preference parameters is fully taken into account. In a behavioural
decision problem the chosen action is optimal taking preference parameters as
given although chosen actions and preference parameters are required to be
mutually consistent. Our framework unies seemingly disconnected papers in
the literature. We characterize the conditions under which behavioural and
standard decisions problems are indistinguishable: in smooth settings, the two
decision problems are generically distinguishable. We show that in general,
revealed preferences cannot be used for making welfare judgements and we
characterize the conditions under which they can inform welfare analysis. We
provide an existence result for the case of incomplete preferences. We suggest
novel implications for policy and welfare analysis.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies decision problems where preference parameters are broadly in-
terpreted to include psychological states (e.g. reference points, beliefs, emotions,
feelings, self-esteem, will-power, aspirations, etc.) or moral states (e.g. personal
commitments, individual values, etc.).
There is considerable evidence from social psychology and experimental eco-
nomics that such psychological and moral factors a¤ect preferences. High material
aspirations may make a person prefer studying business to philosophy; high levels
of stress may make her more prone to smoke a cigarette than when she is relax; a
high level of self-esteem may guide her to prefer challenging options than safe ones,
etc.1.
In addition, there is also a great deal of evidence which suggests that the re-
lationship between preferences and behavior may also go in the opposite direction:
what a person does (or expect to do) may dene her psychological and moral states.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) point out that people are able to cope with stress,
anger or anxiety, by changing their response to a situation (emotion-focused prob-
lem) or by changing the environment (problem-focused coping). In a similar vein,
William James (1890/1981) used the term "self-esteem" to refer to the way individ-
uals feel about themselves which in turn depends on the success they have to accom-
plish those things that they wish to accomplish (in Pajares and Schunk, 2001,2002).
Baron (2008, pg. 68) argues that emotions are partly under our control. Individuals
can "induce or suppress emotions in themselves almost on cue." Some people may
reshape their character, so that their emotional responses change. More generally,
there is extensive work in social cognitive theory by Albert Bandura2, that views
human functioning as the product of a dynamic interplay of personal, behavioural,
and environmental inuence. Bandura points out that the way in which people
interpret the results of their own behaviour informs and alters their environments
and personal factors which, in turn, inform and alter subsequent behaviour through
1Elster (1998) provides a review on how individual preferences are a¤ected by emotions; Sen
(1977) discusses how personal values shape preferences; Appadurai (2004) studies the relationship
between aspirations and behaviour; Benabou and Tirole (2002) study how self-condence interact
with preferences.
2See Bandura (1997, 2001) for a survey.
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an "environmental feedback e¤ect." He labelled this concept reciprocal determinism
(see Bandura 1986)
With this motivation in mind, we study decision problems where preference
parameters are potentially endogenous. A decision state is a prole consisting of
both actions and preference parameters. A consistent decision state is a prole of
actions and preference parameters where the preference parameter is generated by
the action prole via the feedback e¤ect. A standard decision problem is one where
the chosen action is required to be optimal when the feedback e¤ect from actions to
preference parameters is fully taken into account. A behavioural decision problem
is one where the chosen actions are optimal taking preference parameters as given
although chosen actions and preference parameters are required to be mutually
consistent3.
We begin showing that the decision framework with (potentially) endogenous
preference parameters studied here can be obtained as a reduced form representation
of seemingly disconnected types of decision making examined in the literature. The
papers in question include situations where the reference state corresponds to the
decision makers current state (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), psychological games
with a single active player (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Staccheti, 1989), loss aversion
games with a single player (Shalev, 2000), reference dependent consumption and
personal equilibrium (Koszegi, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) and aspiration
traps (Ray, 2006 and Heifetz and Minelli, 2007). We also show that choice with
exogenous frames (Rubinstein and Salant, 2007) or ancillary conditions (Bernheim
and Rangel, 2006) are special cases of the class of decision problems studied here4.
Next, in Section 3, we characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under
which behavioural and standard decision problems are indistinguishable from each
other. We also show that in smooth settings, both decision problems are generically
3Note that in a standard decision problem the individual fully takes into account all the possible
consequences of her actions. However, in a behavioural decision problem, the individual doesnt
fully internalize the possible consequences of her actions and as such imposes an externality on
herself.
4Our framework is also related to dual-self problems proposed by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and
Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Benhabib and Bisin (2004) and Loewenstein and ODonoghue (2005)
among others, to the extent that these models account for the internal interaction between our
"emotional" and our "rational" parts.
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distinguishable. We then explore some specic outcomes of distinguishable decision
problems and we argue that these outcomes have many features in common with
two-player games5.
We explore the welfare and normative implications of our framework. A key re-
quirement in normative economics is that welfare rankings be grounded in individual
preferences. To the extent to which individual behaviour reveals the preferences of
individuals, it follows that such revealed preferences forms the basis for social wel-
fare. The dilemma raised by behavioural economics is whether such revealed pref-
erences can be used for making welfare judgements. In contrast to Bernheim and
Rangel (2006) and Rubinstein and Salant (2007), with endogenous preference para-
meters, we show that in general, without further restrictions/information about the
feedback e¤ect, revealed preferences cannot be used for making welfare judgements.
Motivated by the literature of behavioural economics in which preferences may
be neither transitive nor complete or convex, in Section 4 we o¤er an existence
proof for both, standard and behavioural decision problems, which requires neither
completeness or transitivity or convexity of preferences and action sets.
Section 5 explores the policy implications of our analysis. Our model provides
a general theoretical foundation for policies that directly act on the way a person
learns and becomes aware of her own feedback e¤ect and how she eventually internal-
izes it. These policies include psychotherapy, empowerment, or projects that foster
individual introspection or emotional intelligence. Besides suggesting new type of
policies for the economics literature, our framework highlights some cases in which
existing old policies fail. For example, a policy that provides more information or
more opportunities to a decision maker who faces a behavioural decision problem
could make her worse-o¤.
Finally, in an example that we interpret as a model for poverty traps, we work
out (a) how extrinsic circumstances of the individual interact with her intrinsic
motivation and choices, (b) the nature of policy interventions in such situations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
general model and claries the relationships between the framework developed here
5This is perhaps not surprising as the feedback e¤ect can be thought of as the reduced form
representation of the missing second player. However, we argue that behavioural decision problems
in general cannot be obtained as reduced form representations of two-person normal formal games.
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and other papers in the literature. Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of indis-
tinguishability and welfare. Section 4 provides existence results for standard and
behavioural decision problems with incomplete preferences. Section 5 discusses pol-
icy implications. The last section concludes and discusses directions for further
research.
2 The model
There are two sets, a set A  <k of actions, and a set P  <n of preference
parameters, where <k and <n are nite dimensional Euclidian spaces. A decision
state is a pair of actions and preference parameters (a; p) where a 2 A and p 2 P .
The preferences of the decision-maker are denoted by, a binary relation ranking
pairs of decision states in (A P )  (A P ). The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2
is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is weakly preferred to
(equivalently, weakly welfare dominates) (a0; p0) by the decision-maker".
There is a map  : A! P modelling the feedback e¤ect from actions to prefer-
ence parameters and it is assumed that  (a) is non-empty for each a 2 A.
A consistent state is a decision state (a; p) such that p 2 (a). Let (A) =
fp 2 P : 9a 2 A s:t. p 2  (a)g. Then, A  (A) is the set of consistent decision
states.
There are two types of decision problems studied here:
1. A standard decision problem (S) is one where the decision-maker chooses a
pair (a; p) within the set of consistent decision states. The outcomes of a standard
decision problem are denoted by M where
M =

(a; p) 2 A (A) : (a; p)   a0; p0 for all  a0; p0 2 A (A)	 :
2. A behavioural decision problem (B) is one where the decision maker takes
as given the preference parameter p when choosing a. Dene a preference relation
pover A as follows:
a p a0 , (a; p) 
 
a0; p

for p 2 P .
The outcomes of a behavioural decision problem are denoted by E where
E =

(a; p) 2 A (A) : a p a0 for all a0 2 A
	
:
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Suppose P = A and a 2 (a). In this case, the decision problems studied here
o¤er a way of modelling situations where "the reference state usually corresponds
to the decision makers current state." (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1046).
The following examples show that whether the decision-maker correctly anticipates
the feedback e¤ect from actions to the reference state or not, will have an impact
on the decision outcomes.
Example 1 (M  E)
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig ; i = 1; 2,
and (ai; ai)  (aj ; ai), j 6= i and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but
E = f(a1; a1) ; (a2; a2)g.
Example 2 (M 6= , E 6= , M \ E = )
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig, i = 1; 2,
and (a2; aj)  (a1; aj), j = 1; 2, and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but
E = f(a2; a2)g.
Example 3 (M 6= , E = )
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig, i = 1; 2,
and (aj ; ai)  (ai; ai), i 6= j, and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but E is
empty.
2.1 Reduced Form Representation
In this subsection, we show that the model studied here can be obtained as a reduced
form representation of several distinctive types of models studied in the literature
of behavioural economics.
2.1.1 Psychological games with a single active player
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) (hereafter, GPS) study psychological
games where the payo¤s of each player depend not only on the actions chosen
by all other players but also on what other players believe, on what she thinks
they believe others believe and so on. Each player takes beliefs and actions of
other players as given when choosing her own action. In equilibrium, beliefs are
assumed to correspond to actions actually chosen. In the special case where there
is a single active player, the payo¤s of this single active player can depend on his
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own actions and the beliefs of other players over his own actions. Consider a two
player psychological game. Player 1 is the active player with a set of pure actions S
and mixed actions  = (S). A belief for player 2 is denoted by b 2 B = . The
payo¤s of player 1 over pure actions is given by a utility function u : A B ! < with
v (; b) =
P
s2S  (s)u (s; b) being the corresponding payo¤s over mixed actions. A
psychological equilibrium is a pair

^; b^

2  B s.t. (i) b^ = ^, (ii) for each  2 ,
u

^; b^

 u

; b^

. Clearly, by setting A = P =  and  as the identity map, a
behavioural decision problem is a psychological game with one active player. GPS
show that there are robust examples where the two sets M and E di¤er.
2.1.2 Loss aversion games with a single player
Shalev (2000) considers a class of games where players have reference dependent
utilities and the reference utility depends on the action prole chosen by all players.
Shalev denes two notions of equilibrium, a myopic loss aversion equilibrium and
a non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium. In either equilibrium notion, each player
takes as given the actions of others when choosing her actions. In a myopic loss
aversion equilibrium, a player also takes as given the reference utility when choosing
her actions (even though changing her actions might change the reference utility).
In a non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium, a player takes into account the feedback
e¤ect from her actions to the reference utility when choosing her actions. A single
player version of Shalevs model has the player choosing a mixed action  2  with
payo¤s w(; r) =
P
s2S (s)v(u(s); r) where
v(u(s); r) =

u(s) if u(s)  r
u(s)   (r   u(s)) if u(s) < r ;
r is the reference utility and u : S ! < is a standard utility function. A consistent
reference point r satises the equation r = w(; r). Let R () = fr 2 <jr = w(; r)g.
Shalev proves that R () is single valued and its values are contained in the closed
interval [r; r]. Clearly, setting A = , P = [r; r] and (a) = R (), a behavioural
decision problem is a myopic loss aversion decision problem while a non-myopic
loss aversion decision problem corresponds to a standard decision problem. Shalev
shows that in the static version of his model M = E although the two sets di¤er in
dynamic settings.
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2.1.3 Reference dependent consumption and personal equilibrium
In Kozsegi and Rabin (2006), a persons utility depends not only on herK-dimensional
consumption bundle, c, but also on a reference bundle, r. She has an intrinsic
consumption utilitym(c) that corresponds to the standard outcome-based utility.
Overall utility is given by u(cjr) = m(c) +n(cjr), where n(cjr) is gain-loss utility.
In their paper, both consumption utility and gain-loss utility are separable across
dimensions, so that m(c) =
P
kmk(ck) and n(cjr) =
P
k nk(ckjrk). They assume
that nk(ckjrk) =  (mk(ck) mk(rk)), where (:) satises the properties of Kahne-
man and Tverskys [1979] value function. Following Kozsegi (2005) they dene a
personal equilibrium as a situation where the optimal c computed conditional on
forecasts of r coincides with r. Clearly, by setting A and P to be the set of feasible
consumption bundles and  to be the identity map, a personal equilibrium can be
represented by a behavioural decision problem6. However, under the assumptions
made in their paper, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) show that in deterministic settings
M = E while the two sets di¤er in stochastic settings
2.1.4 Aspiration traps
Appadurai (2004) and Ray (2006) discuss the way an individual can fail to aspire.
Based on their insights, Heifetz and Minelli (2007) study a model of aspiration traps
where an individual in period t = 0 makes a choice e 2 E0, at a cost c(e). For a given
choice e, the decision problem of the individual at t = 1 is described by the tuple
Ge =
 
X;ue; B

where the strategy set of the individual is X, her payo¤ function is
ue : X  B ! <, and the utility of the individual depends on her attitude (beliefs,
aspirations) b 2 B. When choosing a strategy x(e; b) at t = 1 to maximize ue,
the individual takes as given both b and e. However, given e, b is determined by
some preference formation mechanism  : E0 ! B. At t = 0, Heifetz and Minelli
consider two modes of choice. When choice is "transparent", the individual would
"see through" the preference formation mechanism. At t = 0, she would then choose
6An analogous statement can be made for Kozsegi and Rabin (2007), since the solution concepts
they use (i.e. unacclimating personal equilibrium, UPE and preferred personal equilibrium, PPE)
are examples of a "personal equilibrium" dened in Koszegi (2005). The major feature of these
solution concepts is that the decision maker does not internalize the e¤ect of her choice on her
expectations (or reference point).
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e to maximize ue (x (e;  (e))) c (e). When the individual choice is "self-justifying",
her choice of e satises a no-regret condition
ue (x (e;  (e)))  c (e)  ue
 
x
 
e0;  (e)
  c  e0 for all e0 2 E0.
By setting A = E0, P = B and (a) =  (e), it is easily checked that a transparent
choice problem corresponds to a standard decision problem while a self-justifying
choice problem corresponds to a behavioural decision problem. Along the lines of
example 1, they show that M  E.
2.1.5 Exogenous frames or ancillary conditions
Bernheim and Rangel (2006) (hereafter BR) and Rubinstein and Salant (2007) (here-
after RS) study decision problems where there is a set of actions A and frames (RS)
or ancillary conditions (BR) P which determine choices in A. BR and RS argue that
a standard choice situation corresponds to one where an individual chooses between
elements in A. Both papers interpret elements in P as additional observable infor-
mation (like "the order of candidates in a ballot box" (RS) or "the point of time at
which a decision is made" (BR) which a¤ects choices in A. Both papers make the
point that, in practice, it is di¢ cult to draw a distinction between characteristics of
elements in A and variables in P which could also be viewed as characteristics of
elements in A. The idea is that, in principle, the decision maker could eventually
choose the frame or the ancillary condition. That is, she could eventually choose
between generalized decision problems7. However, in any actual decision problem
studied in their papers, an individual takes the frame or ancillary condition as given
when choosing an action. Consistent with this interpretation, it is possible to relate
the decision problems studied in BR and RS to those studied in the present paper, by
assuming that (a) = P for all a 2 A. With this interpretation in mind, di¤erently
from BR and RS, we argue that a standard choice situation is one where all charac-
teristics of actions are taken into account and therefore, the decision-maker chooses
a pair (a; p). Then, the outcomes of a standard decision problem corresponds to one
where the objects of choice are any pair (a; p) 2 AP while a behavioural decision
7A generalized decision problem is what RS call an "extended choice function" and BR a "gen-
eralized choice function"
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problem is one where the objects of choice are a 2 A taking as given p 2 P . With
this interpretation, when (a) = P for all a 2 A, a decision problem with exogenous
frames or ancillary conditions corresponds to a behavioural decision problem.
3 Indistinguishability and Welfare
In this section, we rst state the conditions under which behavioural and standard
decision problems are indistinguishable from each other. Further, we show that in
smooth settings, both decision problems are generically distinguishable. We explore
some peculiar outcomes of distinguishable decision problems. Finally, we derive
necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which it is appropriate to use revealed
preferences for welfare analysis.
3.1 Indistinguishability
A behavioural decision problem is indistinguishable from a standard decision prob-
lem if and only ifM = E. Otherwise, a behavioural decision problem is distinguish-
able from a standard one.
Note that indistinguishability is, from a normative viewpoint, a compelling prop-
erty. What matters for welfare purposes is the ranking of consistent decision states.
When M = E, the outcomes (consistent decision states) of a standard decision
problem coincide with that of a behavioural decision problem.
If  (a) =  (a0) for all a; a0 2 A, a behavioural decision problem is, by construc-
tion, indistinguishable from a standard decision problem. So suppose the map  has
at least two distinct elements in its range.
Consider the following conditions on preferences:
(C1) for a; a0 2 A such that a p a0 for some p 2 (a), (a; p)  (a0; p0) for each
p 2 (a) and p0 2 (a0);
(C2) for (a; p); (a0; p0) 2 A  (A) such that (a; p)  (a0; p0), (a; p)  (a0; p) for
some p 2 (a).
Note that the preferences in example 1 violate (C1) but satisfy (C2) while the
preferences in example 2 violate both (C1) and (C2). Shalev (2000) shows (in
Proposition 1 of his paper) that in the static case his loss averse preferences satisfy
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both (C1) and (C2). Rabin and Koszegi (2006) show that their reference dependent
preferences also satisfy both (C1) and (C2). GPS construct examples where, with
one active player, both (C1) and (C2) are violated. Heifetz and Minelli (2007)
construct examples where (C1) is violated.
In the choice frameworks developed by BR and RS, when (a) = P for all a 2 A,
(C1) guarantees the existence of revealed preferences namely, a binary relation over
A so that for any p 2 P , and a; a0 2 A, a is preferred to a0 in any choice problem
where the only two alternatives are fa; a0g.
In the following proposition, we state that (C1) and (C2) are the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for indistinguishability.
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that both E and M are non-empty. Then, (i)
E M if and only if (C1) holds. (ii) M  E if and only if (C2) holds.
Proof: (i) Suppose (a; p) 2 E. By denition, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for some
p 2 (a). By (C1), for all a0 2 A, (a; p)  (a0; p0) for each p 2 (a) and p0 2 (a0).
It follows that (a; p) 2 M . Next, suppose, by contradiction, (a; p) 2 E \M but
(C1) doesnt hold. As (a; p) 2 E, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for some p 2 (a). As, by
assumption, (C1) doesnt hold there exists a0 2 A such that a p a0 for all p 2 (a)
but (a; p)  (a0; p0) for some p 2 (a) and p0 2 (a0). But, then, (a; p) =2 M , a
contradiction. (ii) Suppose (a; p) 2M . As (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 A(A),
by (C2), (a; p)  (a0; p) for some p 2 (a). It follows that (a; p) 2 E. Next,
suppose, by contradiction, (a; p) 2 M \ E but (C2) doesnt hold. As (a; p) 2 M ,
(a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 A  (A). As, by assumption, (C2) doesnt hold,
there exists a0 2 A such that a0 p a for some p 2 (a). But, then, (a; p) =2 E, a
contradiction.
3.2 Smooth Decision Problems
To further understand the conditions under which indistinguishability occurs, it is
convenient to look at smooth decision problems where decision outcomes are char-
acterized by rst-order conditions. We show that for the case of smooth decision
problems, behavioural decisions are generically distinguishable from standard deci-
sions.
A decision problem is smooth if (a) both A and P are convex, open sets in <k
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and <n respectively, (b) preferences over A P are represented a smooth, concave
utility function u : A P ! < and (c) the feedback map  : A! P is also smooth
and concave.
A set of decision problems that satises the smoothness assumptions is diverse
if and only if for each (a; p) 2 A  P it contains the decision problem with utility
function and feedback e¤ect dened, in a neighborhood of (a; p), by
u+ p
and
   (a0   a)
for each a0 in a neighborhood of a and for parameters (; ) in a neighborhood of 0.
A property holds generically if and only if it holds for a set of decision problems
of full Lebesgue measure within the set of diverse smooth decision problems.
PROPOSITION 2: For a diverse set of smooth decision problems, a standard
decision problem is generically distinguishable from a behavioural decision problem.
Proof. Let v(a) = u(a; (a)). The outcome of a standard decision problem
(a^; p^) satises the rst-order condition
@av(a^) = @au(a^; (a^)) + @pu(a^; (a^))@a(a^) = 0 (1)
while the outcome of a behavioural decision problem (a; p) satises the rst-order
condition
@au(a
; p) = 0; p = (a): (2)
For (a; p) = (a^; p^), it must be the case that
@pu(a
; p)@a(a) = 0: (3)
It is easily checked that requiring both (C1) and (C2) to hold is equivalent to
requiring that the preceding equation also holds. Consider a decision problem with
(a; p) = (a^; p^). Perturbations of the utility function and the feedback e¤ect do
not a¤ect (2) and hence (a; p) but they do a¤ect (3) and via (1) a¤ect (a^; p^).
Therefore, (a; p) 6= (a^; p^) generically. 
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3.3 Distinguishable Decision Problems
In this part, we present a series of examples illustrating the kinds of behavior possi-
ble when a behavioural decision problem is distinguishable from a standard decision
problem. Clearly examples 1-3 already demonstrate that behavioural decision out-
comes have properties normally associated with two-person normal form games.
Below we present a few more examples of behavioural decision making with features
similar to two-person normal form games. In all these examples, we assume for sim-
plicity that A = P are nite sets and (a) is the identity map. The preferences of the
decision maker are represented by an utility function u : AP ! <. We distinguish
between pure and random behavioural decisions. Let (a^) = argmaxa2A u (a; a^). A
pure action behavioural equilibrium is an action prole a such that a 2 (a).
Let (A) denote the set of probability distributions over the set of actions. A ran-
dom strategy is  2 (A), where (a) is the probability attached to action a. A
random distribution over the set of parameters is  2 (A), where (a^) is the prob-
ability attached to utility parameter a^. A random decision state is a pair (; ).
Given a random decision state (; ), the payo¤ to the decision maker is
w(; ) =
X
a2A
X
p2P
(a)(a^)u(a; a^)
A consistent random decision state is a pair (; ) where  = . A random be-
havioural equilibrium is a prole  such that  2 argmax2(A)w(; ).
In each example, the decision problem is represented by a payo¤ table where
rows are actions and columns are the utility parameters. Under the assumptions
made so far, consistent decision states are the diagonal of these payo¤ tables.
Example 4. Unique ine¢ cient behavioural equilibrium in dominant actions
Consider the following payo¤ table:
a1 a2
a1 1  1
a2 2 0
(Table 1)
Notice that a2 is dominant action for both values of p. The unique behavioural
equilibrium is (a2; a2) with a payo¤ of 0. However, note that there is a consistent
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decision state (a1; a1) with a payo¤ of 1 and therefore, (a2; a2) isnt e¢ cient. Finally,
note that the unique ine¢ cient behavioural equilibrium in dominant actions is robust
to arbitrary but small perturbations in payo¤s.
Example 5. Unique random equilibrium
a1 a2
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
(Table 2)
Notice that when the utility parameter is a1, the decision-maker prefers a2 to
a1 while when the utility parameter is a2, the decision-maker prefers a1 to a2.
Therefore, there is no behavioural equilibrium in pure strategies. However, there
is a behavioural equilibrium in mixed strategies. It follows that there is a unique
random outcome in the payo¤ table 2, (12a1 +
1
2a2;
1
2a1 +
1
2a2).
Example 6. Equilibrium in weakly dominated actions and domination by ran-
dom actions
a1 a2 a3
a1 0 0 0
a2 0 1 2
a3 0 2 1
(Table 3)
In this example, there are two behavioural equilibria, one in pure actions, (a1; a1)
and the other random, (12a2+
1
2a3;
1
2a2+
1
2a3). Note that in the pure action equilib-
rium (a1; a1) the decision-maker is choosing a weakly dominated action and at the
random equilibrium (12a2 +
1
2a3;
1
2a2 +
1
2a3), the decision-maker is strictly better o¤
than at (a1; a1). Note also that there is no pure action that (strictly) dominates a1
although there are a continuum of random actions qa2 + (1  q) a3, 0 < q < 1, that
strictly dominates a1.
Example 7. Multiple welfare ranked equilibria in undominated actions
a1 a2
a1 1 0
a2 0 2
(Table 4)
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In this example, there are two behavioural equilibria in pure undominated actions
(a1; a1) and (a2; a2). Note that the pure action equilibrium (a1; a1) is dominated by
the pure action equilibrium (a2; a2). Note also that there is a random behavioural
equilibrium
 
2
3a1 +
1
3a2;
2
3a1 +
1
3a2

. However, in addition, sunspots (i.e. payo¤-
irrelevant events) may play a role in decision-making. Suppose there are two payo¤
irrelevant states of the world fs1; s2g with an associated probability distribution
f; 1  g. Suppose the decision-maker observes the realization of the sunspot vari-
able before choosing her action. Then, for example, the decision-maker could choose
(a1; a1) conditional on observing s1 and (a2; a2) conditional on observing s2 thus ob-
taining, in expected utility, payo¤s in the interval [1; 2]. Note that all these features
are robust to arbitrary but small perturbations in payo¤s.
Example 8. Larger action sets may make the decision-maker worse-o¤
Consider rst a situation where the payo¤ table is
a1 a2
a1  1 0
a2 0 3
(Table 5 (A))
In this case, the decision-maker has a unique e¢ cient undominated action a2 and
there exists a corresponding outcome of the behavioural decision problem (a2; a2)
with payo¤ 3. Now, expand the set of choices so that the following payo¤ table
represents the decision problem
a1 a2 a3
a1  1 0 0
a2 0 3 1
a3 1 4 2
(Table 5 (B))
In this case, note that a2 continues to strictly dominate a1 although now a3
strictly dominates both a1 and a2. The unique behavioural equilibrium is (a3; a3)
with payo¤ 2 < 3. This means that although the action set of the decision-maker
has been expanded so that (a) the ranking of existing actions is una¤ected and (b)
the new action strictly dominates all existing actions, the individual is made worse-
o¤. Note that all these features are robust to arbitrary but small perturbations in
payo¤s.
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Example 9. More information may make the decision-maker worse-o¤
Consider a decision problem with payo¤ relevant uncertainty, with two states of
the world f1; 2g where the payo¤ tables are
1 !
a1 a2 a3
a1  1 0 0
a2 0 3
1
2
a3 1 4 1
(Table 6 (A))
2 !
a1 a2 a3
a1 1 4 1
a2
1
2 3 0
a3 0 0  1
(Table 6 (B))
Suppose, to begin with, the decision-maker has to choose before uncertainty is re-
solved. At the time when she makes the decision, the individual attaches a proba-
bility 12 to 1 and
1
2 to 2. In this case, expected payo¤ matrix is
a1 a2 a3
a1 0 2
1
2
a2
1
4 3
1
4
a3
1
2 2 0
(Table 6 (C))
It follows that the unique behavioural equilibrium is (a2; a2) with expected payo¤
3.
Next, suppose that the decision-maker knows with probability one the true state
of the world. Then, when the state of the world is 1, a3 strictly dominates all other
actions and the unique behavioural equilibrium is (a3; a3) with payo¤ 1 and when
the state of the world is 2, a1 strictly dominates all other actions and the unique
behavioural equilibrium is (a1; a1) with payo¤ 1. Therefore, the decision-maker is
worse-o¤ with more information89.
8Note that in this example we are referring only to information that solves the uncertainty
about exogenous states of the world. Our statement "the decision-maker is worse-o¤ with more
information" would not be right in the case in which additional information helps the decision-maker
to be aware of her own feedback e¤ect and to internalize it.
9This result is consistent with Carrillo and Mariottis (2000) results, although they use a dynamic
model with time-inconsistent preferences.
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Example 10. Rationality versus bounded rationality
Consider the payo¤ table in Table 2. In that example, if the decision maker took
into account the feedback e¤ect from actions to the utility parameter and maximized
the induced utility function v(:), v(a1) = v (a2) = 0. Therefore, a fully rational
decision-maker who takes into account all the consequences of her actions would
obtain a payo¤ of 0. However when the decision-maker doesnt take this feedback
e¤ect into account, we have already seen that there is a unique random outcome of
the behavioural decision problem (12a1+
1
2a2;
1
2a1+
1
2a2) with an expected payo¤ of
1
2 > 0. On the face of it, it would seem that a boundedly rational decision-maker
will be better-o¤ than a fully rational decision-maker. But this interpretation isnt
strictly true. In fact, if a fully rational decision maker is also allowed to choose
mixed strategies in the payo¤matrix in Table 2, she will also randomize fa1; a2g by
choosing the probability distribution

1
2 ;
1
2
	
.
In a behavioural decision problem, the individual imposes an externality on
herself that she doesnt fully internalize. Does it follow from this remark that be-
havioural decision problems are reduced form representations of two person normal
formal games? The answer, in general, is no. In all the above examples, as  is
the identity map, it follows that the best response of the "missing" second player in
pure actions and mixed actions must also be the identity map. However, any best
response that attaches positive probability to two or more pure actions can never be
single-valued: all pure strategies in the support of mixed strategy must give a player
the same (expected) utility and if a mixed strategy is a best-response, any way of
randomizing over the support of that mixed strategy must also be a best-response.
3.4 Revealed Preferences and Welfare
The framework studied here suggests that, in general, welfare rankings should take
place over consistent decision states A   (A). In a recent paper, Bernheim and
Rangel (2006) dene an action a to be a weak welfare optimum if and only if for each
a0 2 A (other than a), a is chosen with a0 present (a0 may be chosen as well). They
also dene a strict welfare optimum as an action a if and only if for each a0 2 A
(other than a), either a is chosen and a0 is not or it is never the case that a0 is chosen
and a is not with a present. Their denitions make a clear link between revealed
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preferences and welfare.
What matters for welfare purposes is the ranking of consistent decision states.
The issue is whether revealed preferences over actions can be used to rank consistent
decision states as well. The following example shows that this isnt always the case.
Example 11. In examples 2 and 4, where (a) = a for all a 2 A, a2 is always
chosen and a1 is never chosen. Therefore, a2 is a strict (and hence, weak) welfare
optimum as dened by Bernheim and Rangel (2006). However, the decision state
(a2; a2) is dominated by (a1; a1) and so the individuals revealed preferences over
actions cannot be used to rank consistent decision states and it is this latter raking
what matters for welfare assessments.
As already pointed out, Bernheim and Rangel (2006) work in settings where
(a) = P for all a 2 A. If we look at examples 2 and 410 with Bernheim and
Rangels (2006) lenses, any pair (a0; p) is a consistent decision state. Therefore, if a
is always chosen over other actions, the individuals revealed preferences over actions
can be used to rank consistent decision states.
However, without further restrictions/information about the map , in general,
revealed preferences over actions cannot be used to rank consistent decision states
and therefore, cannot be used for making welfare assessments. The following propo-
sition states a necessary and su¢ cient condition for revealed preferences to rank
consistent decision states.
PROPOSITION 3. Let a 2 A be a weak welfare optimum. Then, any
consistent decision state containing a; weakly welfare dominates any other decision
state containing a0 6= a, a0 2 A if only if (C1) holds.
Proof: Suppose for each a0 2 A (other than a), a is chosen with a0 present (a0
may be chosen as well). By assumption, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for some p 2 (a).
By (C1), for all a0 2 A, (a; p)  (a0; p0) for each p 2 (a) and p0 2 (a0). It follows
that any consistent decision state containing a weakly welfare dominates any other
decision state containing a0 6= a, a0 2 A. Next, suppose, by contradiction, for each
a0 2 A (other than a), a is chosen with a0 present (a0 may be chosen as well), but
(C1) doesnt hold. By assumption, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for some p 2 (a).
As (C1) doesnt hold, there exists a0 2 A such that a p a0 for all p 2 (a) but
10Recall that, in the examples, (a) = a for all a 2 A.
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(a; p)  (a0; p0) for some p 2 (a) and p0 2 (a0), a contradiction. 
4 Existence Results
It is not hard to check that as long as both A and P are nite and (a) is single-
valued for each a 2 A, a random equilibrium exists.
Instead, in this section, we study existence in situations where the underlying
preferences are not necessarily complete or transitive and underlying action sets
are not necessarily convex. Mandler (2005) shows that incomplete preferences and
intransitivity is required for "status quo maintenance" (encompassing endowment
e¤ects, loss aversion and willingness to pay-willingness to accept diversity) to be
outcome rational. Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1991) argue that reference de-
pendent preferences may not be convex. In this section, we allow preferences to
be incomplete, non-convex and acyclic (and not necessarily transitive) and we show
existence of a behavioural equilibrium in pure actions extending Ghosals (2007)
result for normal form games to behavioural decision problems11. Throughout this
section, it will be assumed that  (a) is non-empty and closed relative to P for each
a 2 A.
Recall that the preferences of the decision-maker is denoted by  a binary rela-
tion ranking pairs of decision states in (A P )(A P ). As the focus is on incom-
plete preferences, in this section, instead of working with , we nd convenient to
specify two other preference relations,  and . The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2
is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is strictly preferred to
(a0; p0) by the decision-maker". The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is written as
(a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is indi¤erent to (a0; p0) by the decision-
maker". Dene
(a; p)  (a0; p0), either (a; p)  (a0; p0) or (a; p)  (a0; p0):
Once  is dened in this way, the results obtained in the preceding sections continue
to apply.
11The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Son-
nenschein (1975) requires convexity both for showing the existence of an optimal choice and using
Kakutanis x-point theorem.
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Suppose  is (i) acyclic i.e. there is no nite set (a1; p1); :::; (aT ; pT )	 such that
(at 1; pt 1)  (at; pt), t = 2; :::; T , and (aT ; pT )  (a1; p1), and (ii)  1 (a; p) =
f(a0; p0) 2 A P : (a; p)  (a0; p0)g is open relative to A  P i.e.  has an open
lower section12. Suppose both A and P are compact. Then, by Bergstrom (1975),
it follows that M is non-empty.
Dene
a p a0 , (a; p)  (a0; p):
The preference relation pis a map, : P ! AA. If  is acyclic, then for p 2 P ,
pis also acyclic. If  has an open lower section, then  1p (a) = fa0 2 A : a  a0g
is also open relative to A i.e. p has an open lower section. In what follows, we
write a0 =2p (a) as a p a0 and a0 2p (a) as a0 p a.
Dene a map 	 : P ! A, where 	(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = g: for each p 2 P ,
	(p) is the set of maximal elements of the preference relation p.
We make the following additional assumptions:
(A1) A is a compact lattice;
(A2) For each p, and a; a0, (i) if inf(a; a0) p a, then a0 p sup(a; a0) and (ii) if
sup (a; a0) p a then a0 p inf (a; a0) (quasi-supermodularity);
(A3) For each a  a0 and p  p0, (i) if a0 p0 a then a0 p a and (ii) if a p a0
then a p0 a0 (single-crossing property)13
(A4) For each p and a  a0, (i) if p (a0) =  and a0 p a, then p (a) =  and
(ii) if p (a) =  and a p a0, p (a0) =  (monotone closure).
Assumptions (A2)-(A3) restate, for the case of incomplete preferences, the as-
sumptions of quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing property dened by Milgrom
and Shannon (1994). Assumption (A4) is new. The role played by assumption (A4)
in obtaining the monotone comparative statics with incomplete preferences is clar-
ied by the examples shown in the Appendix. The following result shows that
12The continuity assumption, that  has an open lower section, is weaker than the continuity
assumption made by Debreu (1959) (who requires that preferences have both open upper and lower
sections), which in turn is weaker than the assumption by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) (who
assume that preferences have open graphs). Note that assuming  has an open lower section is
consistent with  being a lexicographic preference ordering over A P .
13For any two vectors x; y 2 <K , the ussual component-wise vector ordering is dened as follows:
x  y if and only if xi  yi for each i = 1; ::;K, and x > y if and only if both x  y and x 6= y, and
x y if and only if xi > yi for each i = 1; ::;K.
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assumptions (A1)-(A4), taken together, are su¢ cient to ensure monotone compara-
tive statics with incomplete preferences and ensure the non-emptiness of E.
PROPOSITION 4: Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), each p 2 P , 	(p) is non-
empty and a compact sublattice of A where both the maximal and minimal elements,
denoted by a(p) and a(p) respectively, are increasing functions on P . Moreover,
E 6= .
Proof: See Appendix
A di¤erent approach to the existence of equilibrium would be to deduce the
existence result for games with incomplete preferences from the standard existence
result for games with complete preferences as in Bade (2005). We refer the reader
to Ghosal (2007) for details as to why this approach will not work, in general, with
the incomplete preferences.
Schoeld (1984) shows that if action sets are convex or are smooth manifolds
with a special topological property, the (global) convexity assumption made by
Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) can be replaced by a "local" convexity restriction,
which, in turn, is equivalent to a local version of acyclicity (and which guarantees the
existence of a maximal element). However, here, as action sets are not necessarily
convex and are allowed to be a collection of discrete points, Schoelds equivalence
does not apply.
5 Policy Implications
5.1 Internalizing the Feedback E¤ect
A policy intervention for e¢ ciency purposes is only justiable when both decision
problems are distinguishable from each other. One possible policy recommendation
for those cases is to directly act on the way the person learns and become aware
of her own feedback e¤ect and how to eventually internalize it14. In Examples 4
and 6-9, this type of policy would change the behavioural decision problem to a
standard decision problem, the "now sophisticated" decision maker would choose
among consistent decision states, and as a consequence, she would achieve e¢ cient
14An example of such policies could be psychotherapy sessions, projects aiming to foster peoples
emotional intelligence and empowerment, etc.
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outcomes. For instance, we can think of Example 4 as representing addiction: if
the individual doesnt take the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states
into account, she always chooses a2 (smoking) over a1 (not smoking); however, the
reverse would be true, if she took the feedback into account15.
Likewise, we can interpret Example 7 as an example of self-condence and as-
pirations formation. Let a1=not going to school and a2=going to school, with "low
aspirations" and "high aspirations" being the consistent psychological states associ-
ated with "not going to school" and "going to school," respectively. When decision-
makers aspirations are high, she prefers "going to school" (a2; a2)  (a1; a2); while
when her aspirations are low, she prefers "not going to school" (a2; a1)  (a1; a1).
A policy consistent with this type of situations may be an "empowerment" policy,
that would help the individual to become aware of her "internal constrains" and
thus "gaining control over her own life16."
Another added value of our framework is that besides suggesting new type of
policies to unsolved economic problems, it also highlights the cases in which existing
old policies fail. For instance, as it is illustrated in Example 9, a policy that provides
information that reduces the uncertainty of a decision maker facing a behavioural
decision problem could make her worse-o¤. This decision maker will be also worse-
o¤with a policy that increases her opportunity set (as suggested in Example 10). As
a corollary, we learn that for a policy to be successful, it should rstly address the
type of decision problem faced, and only then, design the appropriate intervention
accordingly.
5.2 Poverty Traps
Another type of policy recommendation, this time only consistent with scenarios
of multiple behavioural equilibria (Example 7), would be to a¤ect exogenous vari-
ables associated with potentially endogenous preference parameters. In many cases,
psychological states do not only depend on decision makersown actions, but also
on her extrinsic circumstances (e.g. relative status, social exclusion, poverty, etc.).
Appadurai (2004) and Ray (2006), for example, provide an analysis of the nega-
15See fo example, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) or Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) for di¤erent models
and policy discussion on addiction.
16See for instance Stern (2004) or World Bank (2002) for a reference on Empowerment.
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tive impact of persistent poverty on the "capacity to aspire" and the key role that
aspirations play for the poor to alter the conditions of their own poverty. In the
remainder of this section, we work out an example of how extrinsic circumstances
of the individual interact with her intrinsic motivation and choices17.
This issue is clearly important for policy purposes: when should policy address
the extrinsic circumstances of an individual (like initial wealth social status, health)
and when should it address her aspirations? We provide answers for these questions.
Consider an individual whose decision problem involves the following payo¤-
relevant variables:
(i) a set of actions A = fa; ag, a < a, where a represents maintaining the existing
status quo and a represents changing the existing status quo by undertaking higher
e¤ort (working harder at school or undertaking additional training), embarking on
a new project, etc.;
(ii) a set of extrinsic circumstances  where  2  represents the initial wealth
or social status or state of health or location or level of nutrition of the individual;
(iii) a set of utility parameters P where p 2 P represents the intrinsic motivation
or level of condence or aspirations of the individual.
Assume that both  and P are intervals in <. For concreteness, assume that the
extrinsic circumstances of the individual represent her social status. The individual
can potentially improve her initial level of social status by choosing e¤ort. Her new
social status, ~, is generated by the map s : A   ! . Assume that s(a; )
is increasing in a and , e¤ort is costly and the individual derives benet from
~. Higher values of p correspond to higher levels of motivation and lowers e¤ort
costs. Assume that the preferences of the individual can be represented by a utility
function v(a; p; ~) = b(~)  c(a; p) = b(s(a; ))  c(a; p) where b(~) is the benet the
individual obtains from her new social status and c(a; p), the cost of e¤ort, which is
decreasing in p but increasing in a.
As before, assume that there is a feedback e¤ect from actions into intrinsic
motivation captured by the map  : fa; ag   ! P where, now, the intrinsic
motivation of the individual depends not only her action but also on her initial
social status. Assume that (a; ) is increasing in a and .
17Benabou and Tirole (2003) also study intrinsic motivations but they focus on their interaction
with extrinsic incentives.
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Let u (a; p; ) = b(s(a; ))   c(a; p). For simplicity, assume that u (a; p; ), the
individuals utility from preserving the status quo, is normalized to zero for all
values of p;  and for each p; , u (a; p; ) is the net gain (or loss) to the individual
in deviating from the status quo. Then, under the assumptions made so far, it is
easily veried that
(i) for each , u (a; p0; ) > u (a; p; ), p0 > p,
(ii) for each p, u
 
a; p; 0

> u (a; p; ), 0 > .
In addition, assume that u (a; p; ) is continuous in p; .
Under the assumptions made above, there is a complementarity between actions,
the motivation of an individual (with higher values of p representing higher motiva-
tional states) and her extrinsic circumstances (with higher values of  representing
more favorable extrinsic circumstances).
For each p; , the individual solves the maximization problem
max
a2A
u (a; p; )
This generates an optimal action correspondence (p; ) and given , (a; p) is a
behavioural equilibrium if (i) given ; p, a 2 (p; ) and (ii) p 2  (a; ).
Under our assumptions there is a unique solution, p^ (), to the equation u (a; p; ) =
0 with p^ () decreasing in . Given , p, the optimal action correspondence of the
individual is determined as follows:
(i) whenever p < p^ (), a = (p; );
(ii) whenever p > p^ (), a = (p; );
(iii) whenever p = p^ (), fa; ag = (p; ).
Given , let p () =  (a; ) and p () =  (a; ). Note that p () < p ().
Let = f : p () < p^ ()g, =  : p^ () < p ()	, andM =  : p ()  p^()  p ()	.
Assume that all the three sets ; and M are non-null subsets of . By compu-
tation, it follows that
(i) when  2 , the unique behavioural equilibrium is  a; p () ;
(ii) when  2 , the unique behavioural equilibrium is (a; p ()) ;
(iii) when  2 M , there are two behavioural equilibria,
 
a; p ()

and (a; p ()).
Call
 
a; p ()

a type I equilibrium and (a; p ()) a type II equilibrium. In a type I
equilibrium, there is no change in the status quo while in a type II equilibrium there
is a change in the status quo. When a type II equilibrium exists, the individual is
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always better o¤ at the type II equilibrium decision state relative to the status quo.
When both type I and type II equilibria exist, as the type II equilibrium dominates
the status quo, a type I equilibrium can be interpreted as an aspirations failure, a
low motivation trap for the individual.
The set of equilibria is "weakly increasing" in . For an individual of low social
status with low , the unique equilibrium is type I while for an individual with high
social status with high  the unique equilibrium is type II. For an individual in the
middle, with intermediate values of , there are multiple welfare ranked equilibria
and for such an individual, the theoretical framework developed so far doesnt pin
down the equilibrium decision state i.e. the aspirations and choices is indeterminate.
In order get round this di¢ culty, we develop an equilibrium selection argument
that assigns a probability to each behavioural equilibrium as a function of 18.
Fix  2 M and consider the following adaptive dynamics over p:
Step 1: The initial psychological state of an individual is picked at random from
p; p

according to some continuous pdf f(p) (with associated cdf F (p))
Step 2: Given the p, the individual chooses (p; )  fa; ag which, in turn,
generates a new p0 =  (a; ), for some a 2 (p; ).
Note that the above adaptive dynamics will always converge to either a type
I or a type II equilibrium. Further, note that the basin of attraction for a type
I equilibrium is [p; p^ ()) while the basin of attraction for a type II equilibrium is
(p^ () ; p]. Therefore, the probability that the dynamics will converge to a type I
equilibrium is F (p^ ()) while the probability that the dynamics will converge to a
type II equilibrium is 1  F (p^ ()). As p^ () is decreasing in , it follows that there
exists a ^ such that whenever (a)  < ^, F (p^ ()) > 12 and a type I equilibrium while
will have a higher probability of emerging while (b)  > ^, F (p^ ()) < 12 and a type
II equilibrium while will have a higher probability of emerging.
The preceding discussion can be summarized in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5: When multiple welfare ranked behavioural equilibria exist,
both aspirations and choices, via equilibrium selection, can be determined as a
(stochastic) function of the individual extrinsic circumstances.
18 In Dalton and Ghosal (2007a) we explore a similar equilibrium selection argument using Dalton
and Ghosals (2007b) n-player version of behavioural decisions.
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From our results above we can present some important remarks for policy analy-
sis.
First, the key point in the above equilibrium selection argument is the way the
basins of attraction for each of the two equilibria change for di¤erent values of :
the size of the basin of attraction of the type I equilibrium becomes smaller relative
to the size of the basin of attraction for a type II equilibrium. There is a critical
value of  below which (respectively, above which) the probability attached to the
type I equilibrium is smaller (respectively, larger) than the probability attached to
the type II equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium selection developed here is non-
ergodic i.e. the initial aspiration level determines where the adaptive dynamics ends
up. Therefore, the process by which the initial aspiration level is determined, F (p),
is of critical importance.
Second, both  and/or F (p) can interpreted as a characteristic of the individual
being studied. For example an individual who has a low social status but has the
right motivation could tend to do better than another low status individual with
low motivation. From a policy perspective, the relevant instruments will be both 
and/or F (p). For example changes in  could correspond to things like changes in
initial wealth (social status, health, location, nutrition, housing etc.) of an individual
while changes in F (p) could correspond to process by which the initial aspirations
levels are generated. The formal analysis suggests that direct attempts to change the
extrinsic circumstances (by, for example, enhancing the economic status via transfers
of wealth) will be welfare enhancing for very poor individuals while for individuals
with intermediate wealth levels, policy interventions that directly impact probability
with initial aspirations are generated will also be welfare improving. In this sense,
the argument presented here distinguishes between absolute and relative deprivation
and makes a case for di¤erent policy interventions in the two cases.
6 Final Remarks
To summarize, our paper contributes to the literature in distinctive ways. First,
we provide a reduced form representation of seemingly disconnected papers in a
framework where preference parameters are potentially endogenous. Second, by
deriving the conditions under which a standard decision problem is indistinguishable
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from a behavioral decision problem, we contribute to the small but growing literature
on the welfare implications of behavioural economics. In particular, we show that
the use of revealed preferences for making welfare judgements is problematic.
Finally, in light of these results, we provide policy prescriptions to bring the
outcomes of behavioural decision problems into closer conformity to the normative
ones. An insight from our analysis is that a policy intervention for e¢ ciency purposes
is only justiable for the cases in which both decision problems are distinguishable
from each other. Moreover, the type of policy recommendation will vary with the
class of behavioural decision problem faced by the decision maker.
The results reported here have some empirical caveats. Both, the endogenous
preference parameters and the feedback-map are key variables for policy considera-
tions, though they are not directly observable from choice behaviour. One possible
approach to identify these "unobservable", may be to use evidence from neuroscience
and psychology on the neural processes driving decision making.
Extending the one-person model studied here to n players, dynamic and se-
quential decision scenarios are topics for future research.
Appendix
The role played by assumption (A4) in obtaining the monotone comparative stat-
ics with incomplete preferences is claried by the following examples. In all these ex-
amples, P is single valued andA is the four point lattice in <2 f(e; e) ; (f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g
where f > e.
Example 12. Suppose that (f; f)  (e; e) but otherwise no other pair is ranked.
Then, 	 consists of f(f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g clearly not a lattice. Note that in this case,
 satises acyclicity (and transitivity) and quasi-supermodularity (and trivially,
single-crossing property). However,  doesnt satisfy monotone closure: (f; e) 
(e; e), with  ((f; e)) =  and (f; e) p (e; e), but  ((e; e)) 6= .
Example 13. Suppose that (f; f)  (e; e), (f; e)  (e; e), (e; f)  (e; e) but
otherwise no other pair is ranked. Then, 	 again consists of f(f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g
clearly not a lattice. Note that in this case,  satises acyclicity and monotone
closure but not quasi-supermodularity.
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Example 14. Suppose that (f; f)  (e; e), (f; e)  (e; e), (e; f)  (e; e), (f; f) 
(f; e), (f; e)  (e; f) but the pair f(f; f) ; (e; f)g is not ranked. Note that  satises
acyclicity but not transitivity and also quasi-supermodularity, monotone closure. In
this case, again 	 consists of the singleton f(f; f)g.
Example 12 demonstrates that with incomplete preferences, quasi-supermodularity
on its own, is not su¢ cient to ensure that the set of maximal elements of  is a sub-
lattice of A even when  is acyclic (and transitive). Example 12 also demonstrates
that  can satisfy transitive but not monotone closure. Example 14 demonstrates
that  can satisfy monotone closure but not transitivity. Therefore, monotone clo-
sure and transitivity are two distinct conditions. Example 13 demonstrates that
monotone closure without quasi-supermodularity cannot, on its own, ensure that
the set of maximal elements of  is a sublattice of A.
Proof of PROPOSITION 4:
By assumption, for each p, p is acyclic,  1p (a) are open relative to A and A
is compact. By Bergstrom (1975), it follows that 	(p) is non-empty. As Bergstrom
(1975) doesnt contain an explicit proof that 	(p) is compact, an explicit proof of
this claim follows next. To this end, note that the complement of the set 	(p) in A
is the set 	c(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) 6= g. If 	c(p) = , then 	(p) = A is necessarily
compact. So suppose 	c(p) 6= . For each a0 2 	c(p), there is a00 2 A such that
a00 p a0. By assumption,  1p (a00) is open relative to A. By denition of 	(p),  1p
(a00)  	c(p). Therefore,  1p (a00) is a non-empty neighborhood of a0 2 	c(p) and it
is clear that 	c(p) is open and therefore, 	(p) is closed. As A is compact, 	(p) is also
compact. Next, I show that for p  p0 if a 2 	(p) and a0 2 	(p0), then sup (a; a0) 2
	(p) and inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0). Note that as a0 2 	(p0), inf (a; a0) p0 a0. By part (i) of
quasi-supermodularity, it follows that a p0 sup (a; a0). By part (i) of single-crossing,
it follows that a p sup (a; a0). As a 2 	(p), p (a) 6=  and therefore, by part (i)
of monotone closure, p (sup (a; a0)) 6=  and therefore, sup (a; a0) 2 	(p). Next,
note that as a 2 	(p), sup (a; a0) p a. By part (ii) of single-crossing, it follows
that sup (a; a0) p0 a and by part (ii) of quasi-supermodularity, a0 p0 inf (a; a0). As
a0 2 	(p0), p0 (a0) 6= , and by part (ii) of monotone closure, as a0 p0 inf (a; a0),
p0 (inf (a; a0)) 6=  and therefore, inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0). Therefore, (i) 	(p) is ordered,
(ii) 	(p) is a compact sublattice of A and has a maximal and minimal element (in
the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a(p) and a(p), and (iii) both
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a(p) and a(p) are increasing functions from P to A.
Dene a map 	 : A  P ! A  P , 	(a; p) = (	1(p);	2(a)) as follows: for
each (a; p), 	1(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = g and 	2(a) =  (a). By proposition 2,
	1(p) is non-empty and compact and for p  p0 if a 2 	1(p) and a0 2 	1(p0), then
sup (a; a0) 2 	1(p) and inf (a; a0) 2 	1(p0). It follows that 	1(p) is ordered and
hence a compact (and consequently, complete) sublattice of A and has a maximal
and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a(p)
and a(p) respectively. By assumption 1, it also follows that for each a,  (a) has
a maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) de-
noted by (a) and (a) respectively. Therefore, the map (a(p); (a)) is an increasing
function from A P to itself and as A P is a compact (and hence, complete) lat-
tice, by applying Tarskis x-point theorem, it follows that (a; p) = (a(p); (a)) is a
x-point of 	 and by a symmetric argument, (a(p); (a)) is an increasing function
from A  P to itself and  a; p =  a(p); (a) is also a x-point of 	; moreover,
(a; p) and
 
a; p

are respectively the largest and smallest x-points of 	. 
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